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This document summarizes the results of a study addressing the mission and terrestrial
nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space missions in low earth orbit.
Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space Base mission (from natural sources and
on-board nuclear hardware) have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nu-
clear safety design and procedural considerations involved in launch, orbital, and end of
mission operations are presented. Areas of investigation Include radiation interactions with
the crew, subsystems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles, nuclear hard-
ware and the terrestrial populace. Results of the analysis indicate (1) the natural space en-
vironment can be the dominant radiation source in a low earth orbit where reactors are ef-
fectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety guidelines the reactor can present a low
risk to the crew, support personnel, the terrestrial populace, flight hardware and the mission,
(3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding Integrated radiation limits assigned to
flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible without storm shelter
provisions.
The nuclear safety guidelines resulting from the study should be considered in subsequent
phases of NASA's manned space program to increase mission effectiveness and overall
system safety.
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FOREWORD
Operational and design requirements of large, long
duration manned space vehicles differ from those of the
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular
interest are the radiation survivability and nuclear
safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors
and isotopes and the long term interaction with the
natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-
MS FC (NAS8-26283) has performed a study entitled
"Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express
purposes of addressing the nuclear considerations in-
volved in manned earth orbital missions (operational
and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety
aspects).
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of
Manned Space Flight, Office of Advanced Research and
Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data
Institute. It was performed for NASA's George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of
Mr. Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis
Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA and AEC
advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of
NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes.
The titles and a cross-reference matrix of the subjects
covered in the various volumes is presented in the Table
on the next page.
Questions regarding these volumes may be forwarded to
the following:
Walter H. Stafford,
COR/Technical Manager
Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study
Code PD-SA-0
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone (205) 453-0470
Ellsworth E. Gerrels,
Study Program Manager
General Electric Company
Space Division
P.O. Box 8661
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Telephone (215) 962-7261
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INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
This study addresses the radiological safety aspects
of manned space missions employing nuclear reactors
for prime electrical power and involving extended stay
times in low earth orbit. A Manned Space Base employ-
ing pertinent safety related features from NASA
sponsored studies was utilized for reference mission
purposes. Results of this nuclear system safety study
are considered applicable for future design and develop-
ment phases of manned space programs.
OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this preliminary nuclear system
safety analysis is to identify and evaluate potential
and inherent radiological hazards of a representative
Space Base program and to recommend approaches for
hazard elimination or reduction of risk. The specific
study objectives are listed in Table li
SCOPE
This study addresses the identification and evaluation
of radiological hazards associated with a Space Base
mission. The potential effects of these hazards on
mission support operations, orbital operations, (crew,
Table 1. Study Objectives
• Perform a comprehensive, qualitative nuclear safety evaluation of a Space
Base program.
• Perform gross hazard and failure mode and effects analyses, and establish
failure probabilities for those nuclear related situations that could lead to
risk to the general populace, the ecological system, the crew, and any Space
Base program equipment including experimental equipment.
• Determine the impact of the radiological hazards on a Space Base program
and the Earth's populace and ecology.
• Determine the influence of a Space Base program safety requirements on the
design and operation of nuclear hardware.
• Evaluate the impact of the nuclear safety criteria, guidelines, and require-
ments developed during the study on the nuclear power system and the Space
Base mission.
• Investigate the effects of radiation on operational and experimental equipment
associated with the Space Base program.
• Develop design and operational criteria, procedures, guidelines, and require-
ments governing radiological system safety for a Space Base program.
• Prepare Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports covering the reactor power
system and Space Base in two separate volumes.
• Prepare applicable portions of a System Safety Plan (SSP) covering nuclear
safety for a Space Base program.
• Prepare inputs to NASA's ASRDI data bank for all pertinent reference mate-
rial used in the study and the final study documents.
subsystems, experiments and interfacing vehicles),
and the general populace and ecology are presented.
Design, operation and procedural considerations which
eliminate or reduce these radiological hazards are
identified.
The basic ground rules employed in the study are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Study Ground Rules
• The baseline mission definitions studied in this program are the Space Base
mission designs by McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell as pre-
pared for MSFC and MSC, respectively.
• The experiment program analyzed is that outlined in the OMSF publication,
"Candidate Experiment Program for Manned Space Stations" and its subse-
quent iterations.
• The baseline Space Base power system consists of a zirconium-hydride
reactor(s) coupled with a Brayton cycle conversion system(s).
• The study considers the total Space Base system nuclear safety concept in-
cluding crew/personnel safety, mission success, safety of the ecological
system and of the general populace.
• Means for effecting all normal and in-flight maintenance and repair of nu-
clear systems necessary for crew survival and mission continuation were
part of this study.
• Reliability and maintainability aspects of critical (nuclear) systems, like the
reactor power system, received special emphasis.
• Radiological goals of the study were (1) minimizing radiological exposure to
humans, (2) not exceeding established maximum allowable exposure limits to
humans (3) control of equipment radiation dose and dose rates within identi-
fied limits, and (4) minimize mission aborts or loss of equipment attributed
to radiological effects.
STUDY APPROACH
The Space Base safety analyses consisted of seven
principal tasks as illustrated in Figure 1. The
Baseline Definition provided the reference vehicle and
mission information required to perform a safety
evaluation of the Space Base program. The Literature
Review (Task 1.0) identified and made available existing
reports, and unpublished data that were potentially
applicable to the study. Pertinent information was
provided on ASRDI forms for use by NASA's Aerospace
Safety Research and Data Institute at LeRC. Task 2.0
identified the radiation limits for the hardware andi
personnel associated with the Space Base Program.
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Task 3.0 involved the identification and characterization
of potential nuclear related hazards associated with the
Space Base program.
An operational safety evaluation of the Space Base pro-
gram was performed in Task 4. 0. The hazards identi-
fied in Task 3.0 were evaluated to determine their
potential effect and impact on Space Base hardware,
personnel and operations. Development of hazard fault
and failure sequence trees were included. Design and
operational guidelines, procedures and requirements
.!
that will eliminate or reduce the hazards were identified.
A detailed nuclear safety evaluation of the reference
reactor power system was performed in Task 5.0, with
emphasis on terrestrial nuclear safety to determine the
hazards and degree of risk to the general populace and
Figure 1. Study Task Structure
ecology. Trade-off studies were performed to deter-
mine the effects on safety of alternate power system
configurations. Operational analyses performed pro-
vided guidelines and procedures for the operation,
repair, replacement and disposal of the power module.
Task 6.0 provided radiological safety guidelines and
procedures for the mission support functions of the
program such as launch, range safety, orbital support,
and recovery. Documentation of all work including
PSAR's, guidelines and the nuclear safety plan was
carried out in Task 7.0. Reference should be made to
the other volumes of this report for detailed analysis
and results of all the tasks.
An additional task was performed which addressed
nuclear safety aspects of transporting nuclear hardware
to and from a Space Base by a Space Shuttle. Results
from that task are summarized in Volume I, Part 2
(72SD4201-1-2).
REFERENCE MISSION
A reference mission was established to allow identifi-
cation and analysis of potential hazards and to provide
a reference design against which the guidelines and
recommendations resulting from the study could be
established and evaluated. The reference mission
incorporated significant aspects related to nuclear
safety from the Phase A Space Base studies of North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas. Several of
the mission features are listed in Table 3. Basic
elements of the hybrid vehicle are common modules
10 m (33 ft) in diameter comprising artificial and zero
gravity habitation and work areas. Several subsatellites
in near proximity orbits are serviced by the Base.
When "built-up", the nominal Base can accommodate
50-man crews in low earth orbit for a 10-year mission.
Such a facility requires large amounts of electrical
power. Nuclear reactors are the prime candidates.
Table 3. Space Base Mission Features
Space Base Definition
Reactor System
Configuration
Orbit
Launch Vehicle
Launch Trajectory
Life!
Crew Size
Experiments
Logistics
Power Module Disposal
Reactor Shield
Radiation Sources
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas Phase A
2-ZrH reactor-Brayton power modules, each with 330 kWt
(50 kWe) nominal ratlng-600 kWt maximum
Power modules on extendable booms of zcro-g core, Artt-
flclal-g rotating hubs.
500 km (273 ran), 55 Inclination
Saturn DJT-21 (launch of 1 or 2 power modules)
46° launch azimuth from KSC; Eurasian over-fly
Mission - 10 years, reactor - nominally 5 years, power
conversion system - nominally 2.5 years
50 (nominal) with 90 to 180 day crew rotation cycle
Extensive on-board and orbiting subsatelllte program
Space Shuttle - primary logistics vehicle Space Tug- final
rendezvous and docking of power module
Boost by Integral Disposal System to 990 km high altitude
disposal orbit
Shaped 47 lithium hydride neutron shield tungsten gamma
shield
Reactors - Space Base, RNS, OPSD
Radioactive Tracers
X-Ray Equipment
Natural Environment - Earth Trapped/Cosmic and Solar Flare
Possible Isotope Heat Sources
The study reference employs two Zirconium Hydride
(ZrH) thermal reactors .vcoupled with redundant Brayton
cycle conversion systems, to provide a total power out-
put of 100 kWe (Figure 2). Capability of a single're-
actor to provide the entire load for short periods is
!
assumed. Nominal lifetime of the reactor is assumed
to be five years with life times of the power conversion
systems somewhat shorter. Repair and/or replacement
of the reactor and power conversion systems is there-
fore a necessity during a 10-year mission. A reactor
power module disposal system is provided to obtain
separation of the "spent" or damaged power module
from the Base and a subsequent boost into a high earth
orbit.
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CONTROL
POWER CONVERSION
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The mission was divided into four phases: (1) Prelaunch,
(2) Launch/Ascent, (3) Orbital Operations, and (4) End
of Mission, as illustrated in Figure 3. Launches of
prime hardware utilize Saturn INT-21's and Space
Shuttles. The ten-year operational phase incorporates
an extensive experimental program with resupply and
logistic support by Space Shuttles. The End of Mission
Phase is characterized by the safe disposal and/or
recovery of the nuclear hardware.
4.0 END OF MISSION
t POWER MODULE DISPOSAL
SEPARATION
TRANSFER TO HIGH ORBIT
• . SPACE BASE CLOSEOUT
CONTINGENCY PLANS
RECOVERY
3.0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
ORBITAL BUILDUP
CHECKOUT
START-UP
OPERATIONAL MODE
CONTINGENCY OPERATION
2.0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
• LAUNCH
• S-IC BOOST
• S-11 BOOST
• RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
1.0 PRELAUNCH
TRANSPORTATION
RECEIPT. INSPECTION. STORAGE |
CHECK OUT AND ASSEMBLY
INTEGRATION
COUNTDOWN
POWER MODULE -990 KM ORBIT
ISOTOPES - RECOVERY
SHUTTLE
BUILD-UP 106 WEEKS
10YEAR MISSION
POWER MODULE REPLACEMENT - 5 YR
SHUTTLE RESUPPLY
EXPERIMENTATION
50 CREW (ART G AND ZERO Gl
INTERFACING VEHICLE SUPPORT
:
INT-Z1 BOOSTER
SINGLE OR DUAL REACTOR LAUNCH
SHUTTLE SUPPORT LAUNCHES
500KM x 55° OR 3(P INCL ORBIT
EURASIAN OVERFLY
3 POWER MODULES AT KSC
90 DAY CHECK OUT PERIOD
COLO REACTOR
INTEGRATION LATE IN SEQ.
KSC COMPLEX 39
Figure 2. Reactor Power Module Details Figure 3. Mission Phases
MAJOR STUDY CONCLUSIONS
• THE NATURAL SPACE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT CAN BE THE DOMINANT RADIATION SOURCE IN LOW
EARTH ORBIT WHEN REACTORS ARE EFFECTIVELY SHIELDED.
• THE REACTOR(S) PRESENTS A LOW RISK TO THE CREW, SUPPORT PERSONNEL, MISSION OPERATIONS AND
TO THE GENERAL EARTH POPULACE WHEN NUCLEAR SAFETY GUIDELINES ARE IMPLEMENTED, (e. g.,
USE OF SPACE SHUTTLE FOR REACTOR RECOVERY VERSUS A HIGH EARTH ORBIT DISPOSAL REDUCES THE
RADIOLOGICAL RISK TO THE EARTH'S POPULACE BY ABOUT 2 ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE)
• TEN YEAR MISSIONS ARE FEASIBLE WITHOUT EXCEEDING INTEGRATED RADIATION DOSE LIMITS ASSIGNED
TO FLIGHT HARDWARE.
• CREW STAY TIMES OF UP TO ONE YEAR ARE FEASIBLE WITHOUT SPECIAL STORM SHELTER PROVISIONS.
• EXTENSIVE USE CAN BE MADE OF EXISTING FACILITIES AT KSC. AN ISOLATED NUCLEAR AND LIQUID
METAL SERVICING AREA IS PREFERRED.
• INCREASED SAFETY THROUGH MINIMUM HANDLING OF A REACTOR POWER MODULE IS ACHIEVED BY USE
OF A UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTER (USED DURING TRANSPORT, STORAGE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH VEHICLE
INTEGRATION).
• THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL PROGRAM IS VITALLY IMPORTANT
BOTH ON EARTH AND IN ORBIT TO REDUCE THE RADIOLOGICAL RISK AND RADIATION EXPOSURES TO
PERSONNEL. THE PRESENCE OF A REACTOR PRESENTS A SMALL ADDITION TO THE TOTAL IN-ORBIT
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL PROGRAM REQUIRED FOR LONG DURATION EARTH ORBITAL MISSIONS.
• NO FORESEEABLE TECHNOLOGY BARRIERS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
NUCLEAR SAFETY GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS.
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MISSION RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS
A reference set of exposure limits for personnel,
typical subsystems and experiments was compiled to
evaluate the effects of radiation on a Space Base mission.
The detailed listings are contained in Appendix A of
Volume H, Part 1.
Damage levels are primarily total dose dependent. In
general, film, emulsions and solid state electronics
have the lowest tolerance levels as shown in representative
Space Base subsystems bulk damage radiation limits
in Figure 4.
Limits assigned to personnel were based on currently
accepted or proposed agency guidelines prescribed for
crewmen, ground support personnel, and the general
populace. Maximum radiation limits for the crewmen
under closely controlled conditions (Table 6 ) were set
higher than those for ground radiation workers (e. g.,
yearly dose to skin (0.1 mm depth) for a crewman is
225 rem whereas 30 rem is currently specified as the
maximum for ground radiation workers).
Table 6. Crew Radiation Limits (REM)
ONSfCM2 II NEV ECU 1 VAUNT)
. AREA
DEPTH
SKIN(0.1MM)
EYE (3 MM)
MARROW
(5 CM)
1YRAVG
DAILY
0.6
0.3
0.2
30
DAY
75
37
25
QUARTER
105
52
35
YEAR
225
112
75
CAREER
1200
600
400
The sensitivity of subsystem electronic components and
other materials to radiation was described in terms of
bulk damage and ionization effects.
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Figure 4. Subsystem Bulk Damage Radiation Limits
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Some 60 experiments based on data from the "NASA
Blue Book" were evaluated to identify radiation sensi-
tivity. Experiments are comprised of electronics and
materials similar to that used in various subsystems.
However, in addition to considering the total dose
limitations, dose rates affecting experiment data
degradation due to "noise" were considered. Data
degradation and total dose limits for several typical
I
experiments in the astronomy discipline are shown for
various types of radiation in Figure 5.
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Bioscience experiments exhibited a wide range of
sensitivity to total accumulated dose, dependent on the
stage of development of the organism (See Table 7 ).
In most cases, biological experiments are considered
more resistant to radiation than man, this being partic-
ularly true of the invertebrates.
Table 7. Biological Specimen Sublethal Sensitivity
BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS
TEST MATERIAL
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Figure 5. Astronomy Experiment Radiation
I Sensitivity Thresholds
A wide range of subsystem and experiment sensitivities
were obtained, indicative of the importance of specifying
the objectives of the subsystems and experiments to be
used in the misssion prior to establishing radiation
limits, which, if not evaluated adequately, could lead to
overly stringent and unrealistic requirements.
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NUCLEAR S A F E T Y IN MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
MISSION SUPPORT H A Z A R D S
Nuclear hardware operations during prelaunch, abort
and recovery phases of the mission constitute the
principal mission support radiological hazards, whereas
the environment must also be considered during orbital
operations. Isotopes continuously emit radiation and
produce thermal energy. Preoperational cooling, anti-
criticality containment and special shielding are re-
quired to enable ground support personnel area
accessibility and maintain radiological safety. Nuclear
reactors present a considerably different situation from
that of isotopes (see Figure 6). Preoperational checks
of a "clean", non-operating reactor can be planned to
—I RADIATION!
NORMAL MAXIMUM
0. 63 MREM/HB
METER
DAMAGED
\ IVBNUruHAL BACKCHQUNO
EXCURSION
f 0.2 0.4 0.6
D I S T A N C E - K M
r—[
l»
LIQUID METAL I
~DOKg IN REACTOR AND COOLANT LOOPS.
POTENTIAL FIRE, TOXIC AND CORROSION HAZARD
J REACTOR NUCLEAR
] HAZARDS AT KSC
I RELATIVELY SMALL
Figure 6. Preoperation-Hazards - Reactor
provide minimum radiation hazards. Only in accident
situations would significant radiation hazards be pre-
sented. Postulated hazards such as an excursion or a
quasi-steady state operating condition (caused by water
immersion) are remote occurrences. Design and opera-
tional features can be incorporated which can virtually
eliminate these potential conditions.
A summary of key results obtained in an analyses of the
hazards during mission support operations is presented
in the following paragraphs.
IMPACT ON OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH CENTER
The reactor can be designed to present minimum hazards
during prelaunch operations. Fission product inventories
will be negligible when minimum power level criticality
tests are performed at the point of manufacture and no
such tests are performed at the launch center.
Radiation levels a few hours after shutdown following low
power operation are very low and would not constitute a
significant hazard nor interrupt operations around the
reactor/shield.
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Radiation levels above 0.15 rem, due to a 100 MW-sec
excursion (considered a worst case and improbable
condition) can be confined to within 5 km (3 nm) from
the launch site and would have relatively no effect on
personnel stationed in the vicinity of the Vehicle Assem-
bly Building (VAB) or immediate fall-back areas. As a
reference, the normal sea level yearly radiation back-
ground is noted to be 0.15 rem.
.
Liquid metal is contained in the primary reactor loop
and may be contained in the intermediate and heat re-
jection (radiator) loops depending on the operating
characteristics of the reactor and power conversion
system. Design for the safe handling and freedom
from liquid metal loop damage is a vitally important
safety objective as liquid metal reacts violently with
O sources such as high moisture content air and
£t
water.
Liquid metal fire protection is incompatible with present
fire suppression at the launch center. Modifications in
present fire protection techniques are required, in-
cluding the addition of liquid metal fire suppressants,
isolation barriers, pumps, etc. Liquid metal fire
hazards can be reduced by minimizing the liquid metal
14 i
inventory (e.g., by use of non-liquid metal radiators,
provision of double wall containment, and the use of
inert gas blankets during storage and transport).
A universal reactor power module transport and storage
trailer provided with environmental protection and
status monitoring functions can serve during transport,
storage, checkout and integration operations to minimize
handling functions and potentially hazardous situations.
Figure 7, illustrates the use of the "transporter" con-
cept. The power module would be placed in a support
cradle designed to accommodate the horizontal loads.
The transporter/cradle would provide the necessary
support for transfer of the power module to the vertical
position for integration with the launch vehicle. An
environmental protective liner around the module pro-
vides protection from the humid, high O content air and
£i
corrosive environment of the launch pad.
REACTOR POWER MODULE
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE
ASSEMBLY, CHECKOUT
AND TEST VERTICAL MATING
AND INTEGRATION
Figure 7. Reactor Transporter Concept
The necessity and desirability of integrating and testing
the reactor power module within the Vehicle Assembly
Building is questionable.due to the limited functional
tests that are required of the power module. Bypassing
the VAB would eliminate the nuclear and liquid metal
hazards presented by the power module in that facility
and special facility modifications would not be required.
Consideration should be given for a direct transfer of the
power module from the Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB)
to the Launch Pad. A power module simulator could be
used for system integration tests within the VAB.
Large isotope heat sources continuously emit radiation
and thermal energy and require redundant prelaunch
cooling. Isotopes should be integrated with the launch
vehicle and Space Base modules as late in the countdown
sequence as feasible to reduce the hazards to the crew
and equipment and provide minimum impact on prelaunch
operations..
IMPACT ON MISSION CONTROL OPERATIONS
Support of manned nuclear missions in orbit will require
essentially the same types of facilities and mission
control capabilities as those presently in use for the
Apollo Missions. Nuclear safety objectives of the
mission are best served by providing prime and backup
support for radiological control, fault diagnosis,
mission and contingency planning, logistics, resupply
and nuclear hardware disposal and/or recovery, as
illustrated in Figure 8.
MISSION PLANNING
STATUS MONITORING
FAULT ISOLATION
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
RADIATION MONITORING
SUPPORTED BY ON-BOARD AND
G ROUND Ml SSI ON CONTROL AND
DATA MGT. SYSTEM
FREQUENT READOUT -PROCESSING ON-BOARD
. HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENTS/ rl
. BIOLOGICAL DOSIMETRY
r M E N T A L Ka.HI(altNVIRONMENTAL ISOLATION
DECONTAMINATION
• ZERO G
• ARTIFICIAL G
PROCESSING
ANALYSIS
WORK SCHEDULING
RESUPPLY
SOLAR FLARE
WARNING
RADIATION EMULSIONS & LOGISTICS
(TO AND FROM)
Figure 8. Mission Support During Orbital
Operations
In addition to processing of radiological data, ground
systems should serve as a prime diagnostic and backup
control center for the assessment of nuclear power
module status. Advanced warnings can be given of ab-
normalities so corrective actions can be taken (in orbit
repair, logistic resupply, etc.).
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Major support is required in nuclear hardware disposal
and recovery. Tracking and backup command control of
disposal functions are required. Retrieval of nuclear
i
hardware and recovery on the earth's surface may be
required during the mission for years after mission com-
pletion. Key to the effective implementation of this
effort is (1) the incorporation of tracking and location
aids on the nuclear hardware and (2) the availability of
trained, quick reaction safing and recovery teams which
can be flown to the land or shallow water impact area.
No attempt at recovery is necessary in deep ocean areas.
The use of the Space Shuttle as a means of recovery and
in support of contingency operations was found to be an
effective means of reducing mission radiological risks
to the crew and to the general populace.
IMPACT ON FACILITIES
Extensive use can be made of existing facilities at the
John F. Kennedy Space Center. Special facilities re-
quired for a program involving support of several re-
actor power modules and isotope systems include (1)
a controlled area Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB)
where reactor and isotope nuclear hardware would be
received, stored and checked-out, and (2) a liquid metal
16
servicing facility providing, as a minimum, a capability
to render safe a damaged and possibly leaking liquid
metal component such that it could be shipped back to
the factory for repair. The new facilities, considered
typical of projected requirements, are illustrated in
Figure 9.
NUCLEAR ASSEMBLY BUILDING LIQUID METAL FACILITY
Figure 9. Special Nuclear Support Facilities
The special and existing facilities designated to support
a nuclear power module must provide nuclear radiation
protection and monitoring, environmental protection and
liquid metal fire protection and suppression capability.
Water deluge and other conventional fire suppression
chemicals used in the VAB and Complex 39 cannot be
used in the presence of a ZrH reactor power module.
Nuclear hardware compatible substances or isolation
from the nuclear hardware must be provided.
RANGE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
The launch of nuclear materials necessitate a new look
at range safety procedures, particularly in regard to
destruct options and launch trajectories which traverse
populated areas such as the Eurasian continent. To mini-
mize potential fragmentation damage to nuclear hardware
and the subsequent release of nuclear material and/or
fission products on populated territories, consideration
should be given to (1) safing the destruct system, over
the territory or (2) releasing of the nuclear hardware
moments before destruct initiation. Timing is critical
and the effects of destruct delays must be carefully
evaluated. Alternatives to these procedures include
the incorporation of fragmentation shields or rather
extensive launch escape systems.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
The radiological safety problems at KSC during prelaunch
and launch can be divided into two categories - routine
handling and emergency handling. The routine handling
of isotopes and "clean" reactors would not require
radiological safety procedures and requirements that are
radically different from those currently employed in
support of the Apollo Program with the SNAP-27 Radio-
isotope Thermoelectric Generator. The radiation safety
group would be routinely concerned with three objectives:
criticality control, radiation control, and contamination
control. Major responsibility for reactor criticality
control, must be incorporated in hardware design and
operations. Radiation control must follow Health Physics
practices -i.e., training of personnel, maintenance of
individual exposure records, health surveys, control of
limited access areas.
Contamination control at KSC and at potential impact
points can be most effectively administered by (1) the
establishment and rigid control of radiation designated
work and exclusion areas and (2) the prompt use of
impact/recovery teams and location devices. Quick
response recovery and decontamination teams are re-
quired at KSC. A mobile team coupled with advance
warning of impending impact zones can minimize the
potential hazards to the general populance.
Mission control can provide assistance in the on-board
radiological monitoring and control of the crew. Cumu-
lative radiation dose records can be kept. Periodic
Shuttle logistic flights can return to the earth radiation
emulsions and urine specimens which would be processed
on the ground. Special packaging and radiation shielding
17
arrangements are required in transport to allow for an
accurate record of radiation doses received. Based on
records received from orbit and ground data systems,
crew assignment and rotation schedules would be prepared.
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NUCLEAR S A F E T Y IN ORBITAL OPERATIONS
ORBITAL OPERATIONS RADIATION HAZARDS
Figure 10 shows the normal radiation environments
from natural radiation and on-board nuclear sources.
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Figure 10. Normal Radiation Environments
The space environment in low earth orbit is the major
normal radiation contributor to the Base, providing a
2
nominal 3 mrem/hr through 1.6 g/cm module shielding.
The trapped radiation-belts provide a majority of this
dose in the reference 500 km (273 nm) 55 degree inclina-
tion orbit. In addition, the depth dose from a single high
intensity solar flare can result in at least 4 rem. Due to
the ability to adequately shield a reactor, its contribution
at the nearest habitable area can be kept quite low. In
the reference Space Base, the dual reactor contribution
is a maximum of 1 mrem/hr. . The yearly percentage
attributed from all sources for a typical Space Base is
shown in Table 8. As is shown, the use of nuclear
reactors on a Base is a minor contributor to the total
annual radiation dose.
Table 8. Estimated Yearly Dose Percentage
Contributions
TYPICAL YEARLY DOSE CONTRIBUTIONS
NATURAL RADIATION
SOLAR FLARES
NUCLEAR REACTORS
OTHER SOURCES
PERCENT
60
26
12
2
A summary of key results obtained in an analysis of the
hazards during orbital operations is presented in the
following paragraphs.
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GENERAL ORBITAL OPERATIONS
The analysis has shown that ten-year orbital missions
with crew stay-times of one year are feasible. Predicted
solar flare activity and practical Space Base Module
shielding necessitate storm shelter provisions for crew
stay-times of over one year.
The natural space radiation environment in typical Space
Base earth orbits can present a more severe hazard to
the crew and space subsystems than a heavily shielded
operating reactor. Lighter reactor shields and higher
operating thermal power levels will increase the radiation
j
levels and likewise increase the hazards to the crew,
subsystems and experiments.
In addition to the nuclear power reactors and the natural
environment, there are several additional potential
sources of radiation (i.e., isotope heat sources, tracers,
X-ray emitters, etc.). It is important that the isotope
heat sources and tracers be adequately shielded and con-
tained to prevent contamination within the Base and reduce
doses to the crew and sensitive equipment.
Several potential, however remote, accidents in-
volving the reactor in orbit can present a considerable
20
radiation hazard to the crew. A reactor excursion and/
or disassembly in orbit can result in highly radioactive
debris around the Base. Emergency plans may require
a rapid response orbit change of the Base and/or tiie
ejection of the damaged power module away from the
Base followed by a disposal into high earth orbit as
illustrated in Figure 11. A collision or impact of
£ 1000
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Figure 11. Excursion Model Timeline
debris with the reactor shield in orbit can result in a
shield leak (loss of H ) and therefore increased radiation
with time (Figure 12). A compartmentalized shield
and/or increased shield cladding combined with leak
detection instrumentation can minimize the hazard and
allow time for repair or replacement.
on.
100.
: 30 DAY ALLOWABLE DOSE
EYE
'. DEPTH . ~ ~j
0.1
DOSE FROM REACTORS
200 TO «00 no 1000 1200 MOD
TIM AFTER PENETRATION-HOURS
Figure 12. Shield Puncture Effects
IMPACT ON CREW SAFETY
Although radiation levels of 3 to 4 mrem/hr are
relatively low, when one considers the integrated doses
for a 6-month crew stay-time and 10-year missions
radiation limits on the crew and hardware must
be considered. The eye dose limits as defined by the
National Academy of Sciences appears to make the eyes
the limiting organ. The integrated dose to the eye as a
function of flight time has been calculated and shown in
Figure 13. The doses are shown with and without solar
flare events. The solar flare data includes the possi-
bility of an event on the first day and another event
10
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Figure 13. Eye Dose as Function of
Mission Duration
occurring 250 days later. Increased shielding in head-
gear can help to reduce the dose to the eyes, however,
consideration should be given to the provision of a storm
shelter for crew stay-times of over one year or to pre-
vent the necessity of replacing the entire crew should a
major solar flare event occur.
IMPACT ON SUBSYSTEMS
The effects of the radiation environments on the sub-
systems of the Base exclusive of the reactor power
module were determined. The principal radiation con-
siderations are bulk (crystal) damage and ionization
(surface) effects associated with semiconductor elec-
tronics , ionization effects in materials and dynamic
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interference effects in sensors . A summary of the
I
equivalent 1 Mev neutron bulk damage effects on typical
Space Base subsystems is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 15 shows the ionization effects.
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The most sensitive components to bulk damage are light
emitting diodes in solid state displays and high power
semiconductors.! Organic materials subjected to oxygen
environments, semiconductors - particularly MOS
devices and film'- are most sensitive to ionization.
NAVIGATION AND CONTROL
RADIATION PROTECTION
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PHOTOGRAPHIC EMULSIONS
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ELECTRONICS MATERIALS
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Figure 15. Subsystem Ionization Radiation Effects
The expected 10-year reactor and natural radiation
environment integrated doses have been superimposed
on the figures to indicate potential subsystem incompat-
ibilities. It is recognized that film will be periodically
resupplied and would not normally be subject to the long
term environments. Where threshold damage to elec-
tronics may be indicated radiation hardening techniques
such as piece part selection can be employed to provide
hardware relatively insensitive to the total radiation
environment expected for a 10-year mission.
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IMPACT ON EXPERIMENTS
Integral or detached modules will contain a multi-
disciplined set of experiments capable of taking precise
measurements. Radiation particle flux rates above
some threshold level could cause "dynamic interference"
where noticeable degradation of data quality results (a
signal to noise ratio of 10 to 1 is assumed). Inter-
ference is frequently present where the environmental
radiation spectrum has components (gamma rays, etc.)
identical to those sought in the experiment. Permanent
experiment damage can also result, but generally dynamic
interference would occur prior to severe damage and
subsequent failure of experiment hardware.
Several of the experiments identified in the "NASA Blue
Book", used as reference experiments in the study, are
susceptible to dynamic interference in certain portions
of the orbit, particularly through the South Atlantic
anomaly. Especially sensitive are devices such as the
air-glow photometer (FPE 5.6), the nuclear gamma ray
spectrometers for high energy stellar astronomy (FPE
5.5) and grazing incidence X-ray telescopes (FPE 5.1).
Where interference is attributed to the natural environ-
ment, temporary curtailment of the experiment operation
may be advisable. Radiation interference from the
reactors may be reduced by shielding or changing the
experiment location. The latter approach is recom-
mended for the two astronomy packages (FPE 5.1, 5.5)
where detached "free-flying" modules should be con-
sidered. Typical minimum approach distances from the
reactor for free-flying modules range from over 1 to 100
kilometers to prevent dynamic interference as shown
in Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Reactor Environment Sensitivity
Biological specimens used in space experimentation
programs have a wide range of radiation sensitivities
ranging from a few Rads to thousands of Rads. The
radiation protection required is dependent on the speci-
men type, age and experiment objective. Monitoring
23
the radiation dose to sensitive bioscience experiments,
such as fertilization and embryolic processes, is
recommended.
IMPACT ON FILM
Photographic film and special emulsions, apart from
special radiation detectors and a limited class of
biological specimens, are perhaps the most sensitive
material to the radiation environment. Film deteriora-
tion during storage and use in space may present one of
the most frequent resupply requirements. High speed
2film (ASA 40(K800) stored or contained within 20 g/cm
shielding must; be used and developed within 25 to 50 days
after delivery to a Space Base in order to insure minimal
fogging effects. A solar flare could eliminate the entire
on-board film supply.
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES
Isotope heat sources and tracers could be contained
t
within the habitable Space Base modules. It is
particularly important that sealed sources (capsules) and
open sources (isotope tracers) be operated in areas that
i
can be completely isolated to prevent low level contamina-
tion of large areas in the event of a release. Careful
design of ventilation and waste management systems is
24
important. Table 9 summarizes the hazards and safe
guards involved in the operation of some of these nuclear
sources.
Table 9. Experiment and Laboratory
Radiological Sources
SOURCE
TYPE
DYNAMIC
GCNERATORS
SEALED
SOURCE
OPEN
SYSTEMS
EXAMPLES
X-RAY MACHINE
PARTICLE ACCELERATORS
ISOTOPE CAPSULES
. WASTE MANAGEMENT
EXPERIMENT
. HEATERS
RADIOISOTOPE TRACERS
HAZARD
. SHIELD DEFECT
. OPERATOR ERROR
. SHIELDING REMOVAL
. CAPSULE LEAK
- FISSION GASES
- FUEL FINES
• INHALABLES (OASES)
. CONTAMINATED
WASTE
- WATER
- SPECIMENS
PROCEDURES/SAFEGUARDS
. OPERATE IN ISOLATED/
SHIELDED AREA
. PROVIDE INTERLOCKS
. RESTRICT ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL
. PROVIDE RADIATION
MONITORING AND
ATMOSPHERE SAMPLING
. ESTABLISH DESIGN
AND OPERATION
REQUIREMENTS BASED
ON auANTITCS TO BE
USED
A suggested approach in the handling of open isotope
sources is shown in Table- 10. Stringency in handling
requirements has been related to the Maximum Per-
missible Concentration (MPC) contaminatiori levels that
Table 10. Open Isotope Source Handling
Requirements
OPEN SOURCES (TRACERS I
POTENTIAL CONTAMINATION
LEVEL
0.1 MPC
1.0 MPC
10.0 MPC
HANDLING REQUIREMENTS
USE IN OPEN
ABSOLUTE FILTERS ON ATMOSPHERE CONTROL
GLOVE BOX STORAGE AND USE
ABSOLUTE FILTERS ON GLOVE BOX
INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM
AIRLOCK PROTECTED CONTROLLED ACCESS LABORATORY
GLOVE BOX STORAGE AND USE
SEPARATE ATMOSPHERE CONTROL AND WATER SUPPLY
DEVOTED DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT
would result from release of the inventory to be used.
MFC should be based on 168 hour (weekly continuous
exposure) recommendations. Decontamination techniques
currently in use may not be applicable in zero "g", with
the exception of vacuuming. However, isotope tracers
may best be located in zero "g" areas to avoid the hazards
resulting from loss of artificial "g" capability. If high
concentrations of isotope are envisioned, removable
laboratories should be considered, to preclude con-
tamination of permanent portions of the Base. These
modules could also be returned to the earth for decon-
tamination and refurbishment.
INTERFACING VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS
Module buildup, logisitic resupply arid experiment support
activities require frequent interface with various
supporting vehicles. The normal Space Base reactor
environment allows for Space Shuttle and Tug rendezvous
at any view angle if loiter times are minimized and
braking gate velocities are maintained within currently
planned specifications. A crewman flying a maximum
17 orbit rendezvous mission with the flight path directly
head-on to the power module (worst case) was calculated
to receive a maximum integrated dose of approximately
24 mrem of which only 4. 7 mrem is attributed to the
reactor power modules (Figure 17).
SHUTTLE
RENDEZVOUS GATES
VELOCITY
<9.15nVsre
(OOd/secl
<6. 1 m/sec
KM n/secl
3MJ&
<1. 5 nVsec
K5 (Used
<ai5nVsec
KasiVsecl
DISTANCE
FROM DOCK
1830-915 m
16000-3000 ID
915-460 m
OOOO-ISOOIU
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1500-50 m
15-0 m
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100
1.0
-X 0.1
DOSE RATE DUE TO
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
(NO SOLAR RARE)
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Figure 17. Space Shuttle Rendezvous
Detached free-flying subsatellites and logistic vehicles
which employ film must be restricted in their operations
and movement in the vicinity of the reactors in order to
avoid reducing useful film life or degradation of data.
However, at distances of greater than 3 km, the natural
environment is usually the limiting radiation source.
The nuclear reactor radiators reject considerable
quantities of heat from the Brayton cycle conversion
o o
system in the range of 350 to 500 K. This condition
poses a potential hazard to EVA activities in the area
of the radiators and also may interfere with IR scanners
used in rendezvous vehicles.
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Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (HNS) fly-by requirements limit
doses at the Base to 0.1 rem per pass. Separation
distances of oyer 125 km should be considered during the
. i
RNS reactor propulsion operations where maximum dose
rate view angles could be attained. Shutdown (loiter)
distances during RNS and Base logistic operations allow
approaches within a few kilometers without experiencing
experiment dynamic interference of the Base experiments.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
Maintenance and repair operations within the Base are
generally not directly affected by the nuclear environ-
ment unless operations are in near proximity to nuclear
sources. EVA operations, however, are outside the
module shielding. The dose to the skin from the natural
environment during EVA is increased by a factor of two,
the corresponding increase to the depth doses being sub-
stantially less.
I
The dose to the, rear of the reactor power modules is
highly dependent on shield configuration and reactor
power level. In the configuration shown in Figure 18,
the dose only becomes a significant factor when near the
reactor, the dose at 8 m from the reactor being less than
43 mrem/hr with both reactors operating.
30 MREM/HR 0.35
POWER LEVEL 330KWT/REACTOR
ENGINE ROOM WALL THICK: 1 CM/CM'
REPAIRABLE BY
REPLACEMENT^
ONLY
ENGINE ROOM DOSE
43 MR/HR
Figure 18. Maintenance & Repair Radiation Zones
A reasonable maintenance capability of the power con-
version system and associated components can be pro-
vided within a protected and possibly pressurized "engine
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room" located in the rear of the power module. This is
an important feature since the repair frequency within
the engine room could be at least twice a year.
Repair of a previously operated reactor, shield and NaK
lines is considered impractical if not impossible due to
high radiation levels around these components. However,
the Manned Shuttle or Tug installation of a "clean" reactor
can be accomplished without shut-down of the other re-
actor in the reference design, as radiation levels at the
docking interface are about 13 mrem/hr. Replacement
by manned vehicle of a "spent" reactor should be accom-
plished no earlier than 10 days after its shutdown to
allow for radiation decay to tolerable levels.
RADIATION MONITORING AND CONTROL
Knowledge of the status of the crew's radiation exposure
(accumulated and instantaneous doses) throughout the
Space Base is a necessary part of the mission.
The radiation monitoring system must not only measure
the absorbed dose and relative biological effectiveness
of protons, electrons, photons and neutrons, but also
measure these quantities at both skin and critical organ
depth. Obviously no single system can meet all these
criteria. Four separate systems appear to be required:-
(1) Passive Dosimetry, (2). Active Dosimetry, (3) Health
Physics Instrumentation, and (4) Biological Dosimetry.
Frequent readout is required, necessitating some read-
out in space. A reasonable system would require each
crewman to have a Thermo-Luminescent Dosimeter rod
connected with an identification card. Insertion into a
special reader would give a daily readout on each
individual which could be tabulated and analyzed by the
on-board data management system. Radiation control
would be implemented by the use of several radiation
instruments connected to alarms -which can be pro-
grammed to signal the closing of doors and isolate
ventilation systems. Decontamination techniques must
be developed for application in zero-g and artificial-g
modules.
An effective radiological monitoring and control program
must incorporate a complement of trained personnel. It
is estimated that in a crew of 50, an average of at least
3 men are required to support the entire radiological
control program. Personnel include a radiation safety
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officer assisted by the astronaut crew who have been
cross trained to allow them to make valid risk judge-
ments and to function effectively in radiation emergencies.
I
The presence ;of the reactors on a Space Base mission
requires minimum support, the direct support of the
reactors accounting for only 1/2 of a crewmans time out
of the total of 3 required for the entire program.
The radiological monitoring and control program require-
ments for a crew of 50 are summarized in Table 11.
Table 11. Personnel Requirements for Radiological
Safety Program
Personnel Type
Radiation Safety Officer
RadUtloo Safety Technicians
Medics! Stafl
Radiological Operation Crew
Remainder
Duties
• Care (or radiation monitoring equipment
• Keep records on accumulated exposure
• Make aurvcya, interpret data from radiation
: monitors
1
 • Emergency responsibilities/dec! a lona
• Radiation safety training program
• Supervision of Radiation Safety Technicians
• Collate Data Management Information front
Baae and Ground Links
1
 • Instrument maintenance, repair and
logistics support
• Health Physics surveys
' • Emergency responsibilities
• Read and record TLT), film, and police
passive monitoring regulations
a Responsible for biological dos line try
a Care for overexposed
• Emergency re spooal bill ties
a Reactor repair, EVA's other non- routine
Jobs involving radiation expoeure
• Assist RSO as required
i a Emergency responsibilities
1
 • Work amongst radiation hazards
Remarks
* • Cbe Individual
• Training * Health Physics certification.
Radiation Biology, Instrumentation
• Part-time responsibilities, also active In
scientific experimentation
• Two individuals
• Training - Nuclear facilities work -
Instrumentation and Health Physics opera-
tion and maintenance experience
• Training and experience in treating radiation
sickness
• At least six, Individuals with nuclear facility
experience
• 40-bour (minimum) prefllgbt radiation safety
training program at National Laboratory
• In-flight training by RSO
• 6-hour (minimum) radiation aafety training
program by RSO or comparable individuals.
• In-night training by RSO
HOTESj
1. A maximum of 3 crew
2. The use of nuclear i
estimate In Note 1.
members would be devoted full-time to the radiological safety program, during a period of normal operation.
:tora for electrical power generation account* for approximately one man, half-time, of the crew utilization
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Qualitative studies of nuclear safety implications con-
cerned with reactor power module configurations arid
operation were performed.
REACTOR POWER MODULE STUDIES
advantages result due to the ability to release contained
hydrogen moderator from the fuel, low void fractions
and the strong negative temperature coefficient.
DESIGN/CONFIGURATION IMPACT ON SAFETY
The major conclusions resulting from the configuration
study are shown in Table 12. Adequate separation dis-
tance between power modules and the Base is important.
Several Power Conversion System (PCS) features can
increase nuclear safety. The Brayton and organic
Rankine cycles permit relatively low temperature opera-
tion which allows the use of non-liquid metal radiators.
Toxic, corrosive and explosive coolants should be
avoided where feasible. Multiple operating PCS units
are preferred for safe shutdown and to minimize tempera-
ture transients. A separable heat exchanger allows for
modular assembly and permits significant increases in
the reentry ballistic coefficients extending reactor orbital
lifetimes by as much as a factor of ten.
The ZrH reactor is characterized by some inherent
safety advantages as compared to a fast reactor. Major
Table 12. Reactor Power Module Design/Configuration
Study Conclusions
\1 . SEPARATION DISTANCE IMPORTANT|1 FOR SERVICING AND ACCIDENT
LJ
 PROTECTION
!
. RENDEZVOUS CORRIDORS MUST BE
KEPT OPEN
INTERACTIONS AND IMPROVES REPLACE-
MENT
. DISPOSAL AND INSTALLATION OF SINGLE
POWER PLANTS DESIRED
CONCLUSION
BASELINE AND OPPOSITE END CONFIGURATIONS FAVORED
BRAYTON
THERMOELECTRIC
MERC-RANKINE . MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT
ORGANIC RANKINE KEY FACTOR
THERMIONIC
 m REACTOR THERMAL POWER LEVELS
AFFECTED (FISSION PROD, REUAB)
• REACTOR OPERATING TEMP
DEPENDENT (RELIABILITY)
• TOXICITY AND CORROSION TO BE
AVOIDED IF POSSIBLE
• SAFE SHUTDOWN
CONCLUSION
BRAYTON (BASELINE) IS REASONABLE CHOICE
• MULTIPLE OPERATING PCS PREFERRED
FOR MODULAR APPROACH
• SEPARATION DISTANCE INCREASE -
IMPROVE REPAIR CAPABILITY
CONCLUSION
PCS DESIGN FEATURES CAN INCREASE NUCLEAR SAFETY
• — ALTERNATE REACTORS —
LOWER COMPACTION PROBABILITY X
INSUSCEPTIBILITY TO CRITICAL
MASS *
NO EXCURSION IN WATER
NO WATER MODERATION
COOLANT WORTH FOR SHUTDOWN
OVERTEMPERATURE CAPABILITY
CONTROL SAFETY MARGIN X
PROMPT CRITICAL HAZARD X
' FUEL LOAD X
CONCLUSION
Z.H REACTOR DESIGN HAS SIGNIFICANT AOV
FAST
1
X
X
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OPERATIONAL IMPACT ON SAFETY
Several qualitative Power Module Operational studiesi • '
were also performed, results of which are summarized
in Table 13.
A nominal 950 km orbit (> 1100 year decay time) was'
selected as the desired disposal orbit to provide a
minimum orbital decay lifetime of 100 years should
disposal rocket failures occur. The Shuttle provides an
effective means of disposal/recovery if the Power Module
is designed compatible with the Shuttle cargo bay. In
either case the reactor/shield must be capable of separate
reentry should contingencies dictate.
Positive reactor shutdown at the end of its lifetime is
considered essential. Several schemes were considered
with the use of a neutron poison combined with control
1
 \.
drum lockouts looking most feasible. Additional study is
required in this| area to determine the effect on perfor-
mance and reliability of the system.
Repair is enhanced by use of a press urizable engine
room. Although the radiation environment, high
temperatures and liquid metal hazards restrict repair
operations, considerable repair is feasible, even with
one of two reactor power modules in operation.
Table 13. Reactor Power Module Operational
Study Conclusions
MODE ~ HIGH EARTH ORBIT BOOST
ALTITUDE ~>%SOKM (SOONM)
RE-ENTRY CAPABILITY REQUIRED
BACK-UP—REPLACEMENT OR SHUTTLE
MOST CONSERVATIVE SOLAR FLUX MODEL
CONCLUSION
BOOST TO HIGH EARTH ORBIT WITH RE-ENTRY
CAPABILITY
FOUR POSITIVE SHUTDOWN MOOES
CONSIDERED
1. HIGH ORBIT OESTRUCT
2. NEUTRON POISON INJECTION
3. RELEASE OF MODERATOR
4. CONTROL DRUM LOCKOUT
CONCLUSION
SIMPLE OUTWARD ROTATION OF DRUMS
IS NOT ADEQUATE
POSITIVE SHUTDOWN BY NEUTRON POISON
AND DRUM LOCKOUTS RECOMMENDED
REPAIR/REPLACEMENT
REPAIR IN GALLERY NOT PRACTICAL
(200 REM -» 0 9R/HR)
BREAKING/JOINING OF N»K LINE
IMPRACTICAL
BLACK BOX REPLACEMENT IN LOWER
RADIATOR (43 MREM/HR)
PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT MINIMIZES
TIME
NO EFFECTIVE REPAIR WITH TUG OR
SHUTTLE EXCEPT FOR FREE ORBITING
CASE
CONCLUSION
SIMPLE, SHORT TIME REPAIR SHOULD BE PLANNED
-INSTALLATION
. COLD REACTOR CAN BE INSTALLED BY
TUG OR SHUTTLE
• SHUTTLE COMPATIBLE MODULES ARE
DESIRED
. INSTALLATION WITH OTHER OPERATING
POWER SYSTEM FEASIBLE (I] MREM/HR)
• CONTROL DRUM LOCKOUTS
CONCLUSION
INSTALLATION WITH MANNED VEHICLE POSSIBLE
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A preliminary terrestrial safety analysis (safety of the
earth's general populace and ecology) was performed
for all phases of the Space Base mission involving the
ZrH reactor power modules (Ref. Volume m
(72SD4201-3) of the Study). The primary mode of
reactor disposal was assumed to be a boost to high earth
orbit to allow for fission product decay.
T E R R E S T R I A L NUCLEAR SAFETY
(less than 4 individuals per 1000 missions performed).
The implementation of additional safeguards can reduce
the risk even further (e.g., use of the Space Shuttle for
reactor recovery versus a high earth orbit disposal
reduces the radiological risk to the earth's populace by
about 2 orders of magnitude).
A comprehensive set of failure sequence trees was
developed for all credible accident/failure event situations
in the entire mission, beginning with prelaunch activities
at KSC and culminating with the disposal of the reactor.
Probabilities of failures were estimated, radiological
source terms calculated and the number of people affected
were determined.
Accident, mission phase and total mission risk was
determined utilizing the dose guideline approach which
accounts for the exposure of all individuals subjected to
25 rem and above. A summary of the risk by mission
phases is shown in Figure 19. The analysis has shown
that the overall mission risk to the general populace is
_3
low; it is estimated that less than 4 x 10 individuals
will receive more than 25 rem of radiation per mission
£ 1"
v»
i
eQ. _:
£ 10'
£
a 10"
*
£
10'7
• MISSION RISK LOW TO
GENERAL PUBLIC
• REACTOR DISPOSAL RISK |
DOMINANT
PRELAUNCH LAUNCH/ ORBITAL REACTOR
ASCENT OPERATIONS DISPOSAL
.HIGHEST
RISK
ACCIDENTS
FOR EACH
PHASE
RISK REDUCTION
51 DESIGN FOR
S NO EXCURSION
] SHUTTLE RECOVERY](REACTOR DISPOSAL
'PHASE SHOWN ONLY)
TOTAL
Figure 19. Mission Risk Summary
31
The analysis and results are preliminary and some of
the probability and risk values and failure modes identified
apply specifically to the reference ZrH reactor and
operating conditions. However, much of the analysis,
conclusions and recommendations are applicable to all
future space reactor powerplants. For the most part,
revised probabilities, source terms and failure modes
can be factored into the analysis (abort sequence trees,
etc.) to determine the effect on mission risk due to
changes in design or operating conditions.
Several of the specific conclusions resulting from the
analysis are identified in Table 14.
i
Table 14. Terrestrial Safety Conclusions
Libw power testing of the reactor at the factory (100 watts for 12 days maxi-
mum) followed by delivery to the launch center same 60 days hence, provides
a very low radiation environment and fission product inventory during pro-
launch and launch activities.
There will be no radiological risk to the general public resulting from a pre-
launch or launch accident at KSC since the radioactive contamination la below
specified dose guideline values (25 rem) outside the KSC boundary.
The most significant risk is from prolonged exposure to reactor debris fol-
lowing land impact - generally associated with the disposal phase of the mis-
sion'where fission product Inventories can be high. The most significant re-
duction in risk can be obtained by implementation of operational and design
safeguards associated with this phase.
I
Contamination of reservoir water and pasture land can lead to an ingestlon
exposure problem If the supply water or milk Is not expeditiously detected
and then quarantined.
ZrH reactor fission product Inventories are considered negligible after 100
years of decay. Disposal orbits for the reference power module should pro-
vide a minimum 100 year lifetime.
The use of the Space Shuttle for reactor recovery aa contrasted to a high
earth' orbit disposal by a disposal system can reduce the risk attributed to
the disposal phase by approximately 2 orders of magnitude.
Design for no excursion and the incorporation of a permanent shutdown sys-
tem can provide an approximate 50 percent reduction In mission risk. The
risk attributed to the launch/ascent phase would be essentially zero.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY GUIDELINES SUMMARY
A number of guidelines have resulted from the study and
are delineated in Volume V, 72SD4201-5-1. Reference
shall be made to this document and supporting data in
the implementation of nuclear safety guidelines in future
Manned Space Flight programs. Guidelines are sum-
marized in accordance with the following hazard reduc-
tion sequence:
• Design Features, Table 15
• Safety Devices, Table 16
• Warning Devices, Table 17
• Special Procedures, Table 18
Table 15. Design Features
DESIGN FEATURES I
1. Provide special nuclear assembly and storage facilities capable of seg-
regating isotope and reactor storage and checkout activities.
2. Nuclear storage and checkout facilities must be provided with proper
environmental control and design features to reduce liquid metal fire
hazard potential.
3. Provide redundant cooling capability for isotopes during storage, check-
out, transportation and at the launch pad.
4. Where feasible, consider use of non-liquid metal radiators.
5. Provide a universal transporter in support of transportation and pre-
launch activities.
6. Provide for the use of the Space Shuttle as the prime and/or backup
means of launch and/or recovery of nuclear hardware.
7. Provide Storm Shelter facilities for refuge from Solar Flare events.
8. Provide on-board radiological monitoring of radiation dose accumulated
by the crew.
9. Select subsystem components and component piece parts with higher
than average performance to minimize the effects of degradation due to
radiation over the mission duration.
10. Provide orbit adjust capability to rapidly change Space Base orbit alti-
tude in the event of a severe nuclear incident in orbit.
11. Provide separate waste management systems for crew and laboratory
contaminated waste.
12. Provide for detached module implementation of gamma ray and neutron
sensitive experiments.
2
13. Provide shielded storage (approximately 20 g/cm ) for photographic
film and emulsions.
14. Locate laboratories using relatively large isotope tracer concentrations
in zcro-g and possible i sola table and removable portions of the vehicle.
15. Provide a positive mechanical system for separation of the reactor
power module from the Space Base.
16. Provide fragmentation and impact protection for nuclear hardware.
17. Design reactor to preclude criticality accidents and destructive excur-
sions.
18. Provide positive means of sensing reactor control drum position.
19. Provide puncture and rupture protection for NaK coolant lines (double
containment features).
20. Provide an effective reactor reentry and impact protection system.
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Table 16. Safety Devices Table 18. Special Procedures
SAFETY DEVICES
1. Provide anti-criticality nod penetration-free containment for nuclear
hardware.
2. Provide control drum lock-out devices for reactor powerplants.
3. Consider use of dummy powerplaot for integration tests In VAB.
4. Provide compatible liquid metal fire protection and fighting capability
wherever liquid metals are present.
5. Provide radiation and thermal shields for prolonged operations around
a large isotope heat source.
6. Provide multiple escape routes for personnel in radiation hazard areas.
7. Consider use of liquid metal sump tanks to isolate and contain liquid
metal leaks In prime hardware.
8. Provide safing of the S-n destruct system as Eurasion overfly is made.
9. Provide means of sating a reactor and terminating a quasi-steady state
critical condition.
10. Provide rapid response recovery, safiog and decontamination capability
over entire potential Impact zone.
11. Provide emergency EVA suits compatible with a NaK environment.
12. Provide shielding and control interlocks and restrict reorlentatlon of
dynamic radiation generators (x-rays. Ion guns, lasers and microwave
sources).
13. Provide an effective and automatic means of reactor shutdown under all
conditions.
14. Provide for positive and permanent reactor shutdown prior to disposal
or recovery.
15. Provide for the safe and prompt disposal or recovery of a spent or mal-
functioning reactor.
16. Provide tracking and location aids for land and water recovery of nuclear
hardware.
Table 17. Warning Devices
WARNING DEVICES I
1. Provide personnel dosimetry and radiation monitoring and warning signs
and instrumentation In all areas where nuclear hardware is present.
2. Provide proper escort and warnings during transportation.
3. Provide rapid response fire alarm and detection systems for liquid
metal fires.
4. Provide proper liquid metal fire fighting materials with yellow markings.
5. Provide integrated dose, nuclear system status and fault diagnostic sup-
port in orbit and at the Mission Control Center (MCC).
6. Provide ground supported advanced warnings of malfunctions or haz-
ardous conditions where possible (solar flare event, etc.).
7. Provide a central on-board warning system for monitoring and alerting
against radiological hazards.
8. Provide proper governmental authorities with technical data for ad-
vanced warnings and preparations required for impending ground im-
pact of nuclear material.
0. Provide means for monitoring and warning of imminent collisions with
space debris and orbiting vehicles.
10. Provide for liquid metal leak detection during prelauncb and in orbit.
SPECIAL PROCEDURES
1. Select routes to avoid heavily travelled and populated areas in the trans-
port of nuclear hardware.
2. Use cross-trained personnel In support of nuclear hardware prelaunch
activities with actual real situation experience {radiation and liquid
metal hazards).
3. Limit and regulate 'personnel/activities in radiation areas.
4. Limit use and presence of ordnance and disposal rocket motors within .
nuclear facilities. ' • -
5. Perform reactor critlcality checks prior to delivery to launch site (KSC).
6. limit critlcality tasting to provide negligible fission product inventory
7. Employ two man "buddy" system in hazardous areas.
8. Install reactor power modules and Isotopes systems as late In the pre-
launch sequence as feasible.
9. Provide appropriate procedural modifications In the KSC Ground Safety
Plans and the USAF Range Safety Manual.
10. Keep nuclear hardware operations at the launch pad to a minimum.
11. Maintain control drum lockouts in position during prelaunch operations.
Restrict control drum movement to a single drum,
12. Conduct thorough evaluation of the necessity and desirability of integra-
tion and testing of nuclear reactor power modules within the VAB.
13. Prohibit smoking and eating In designated radiation and liquid metal
areas.
14. Maintain current administratively controlled areas with a minimum
radius of approximately 13 km and exclusions areas of 4 km radius.
15. Consider limiting flight termination Impact areas to outside the con-
tinental shelf.
16. Provide continuous attended support by the MCC for warning, radiolog-
ical control and fault diagnosis.
17. Establish crew rotation procedures in conformance with career and
periodic dose guidelines.
18. Restrict EVA during orbits Intercepting the South Atlantic Anomaly.
19. Restrict approach paths of vehicles employing 1R (infrared) sensors to
avoid interference from high temperature sources.
20. Establish minimum rendezvous distances and shielded approach corri-
dors to orbital vehicles employing nuclear power systems to minimize
exposure of crew.
21. Provide experiment data screening procedures for experiments sensi-
tive to South Atlantic Anomaly Interference.
22. Minimize power level on operating reactors during reactor replacement.
23. Repairs to NaK lines in space are not considered feasible.
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A review of the analyses and results of the study was
made to identify areas where significant additional
research and development are required. Several of the
key areas of technology are briefly discussed below.
LAUNCH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS-NUCLEAR HARDWARE
IMPACT
The prime objective of such a study shall be to study and
identify the projected facility needs for support of future
nuclear programs such that a plan can be implemented
which makes maximum usage of existing facilities. In
addition, new facilities required can be designed with
future growth capability and serve multiple usages. An
additional study area could involve a preliminary identifi-
cation of nuclear hardware operational procedures to
determine the impact on launch operations.
LIQUID METAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS-IMPACT AT
LAUNCH CENTER
Reactor power systems for space applications use signifi-
cant quantities of liquid metal coolant. The safe handling
and servicing of this hardware and liquid metal inventory
must be provided at the launch center. The facility and
TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
procedural requirements necessary for the support of
future programs shall be identified such that results can
be factored into future plans, budgets and schedules.
LAUNCH SUPPORT FIRE PROTECTION-NUCLEAR
H A R D W A R E IMPACT
This study indicates the requirements for fire protection
at the Launch Complex and notes the possible incompati-
bility between conventional fire protection techniques and
materials and characteristics of the nuclear/liquid metal
hardware. Present fire protection methods rely exten-
sively on water deluge and sprinkler systems. However,
water and other common fire extinguishing solutions are
not compatible with liquid metal. The objective of the
study shall be to identify fire protection techniques and
possible technology programs which have as a goal the
compatibility with nuclear hardware at the launch pad,
assembly and storage facilities.
NUCLEAR REACTOR/POWER MODULE SEPARATION
The capability of separating the reactor/shield assembly
from the power module assembly has been shown to be a
significant means of enhancing nuclear safety. Studies
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should be performed which would indicate approaches to
providing reactor separation techniques to maximize
nuclear safety while minimizing system performance
penalties.
REACTOR PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY
This study indicates the importance of a reliable reactor
protection system. The adequacy of a LiH shield as
presently envisioned for use with the ZrH reactor is in
question. A technology program should be initiated
prior to establishing a firm reactor shield design which
addresses the capability of the shield for (1) radiation
protection, (2) penetration resistance, (3) waste heat
removal, and (4) reentry protection, in the long term
thermal and radiation environment to which it would be
subjected. Optimum materials would be selected and
i
preliminary design concepts would be formulated. Full
scale tests should be performed prior to commitment to
the operational flight program.
BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION SCHEMES AND
ESTIMATION MODELS
The high energy fragments resulting from exploding
tanks are of major concern for the proper design of -.
nuclear hardware, as well as spacecraft equipment.
The source of this fragmentation includes booster pro-
pellant tanks as well as storage tanks aboard the space-
craft. However, very little information or data is
currently available to characterize the fragments with
regard to size, shape and velocity. The purpose of this
proposed program is to develop analytical models,
supported by an extensive test program, for the predic-
tion of tankage fragmentation as well as the study of
shielding materials and methods of protection.
REACTOR PERMANENT SHUTDOWN
The study substantiates the need for a permanent reactor
shutdown system. Such a system would significantly
reduce the risks due to a reactor impact on the earth's
surface or in shallow water areas. Therefore a program
should be initiated to investigate the techniques, feasi-
bility and merits of a positive and permanent reactor
shutdown system to preclude reactor criticality and
excursion accidents during disposal and on earth impact.
NUCLEAR DEBRIS IN ORBIT
The study indicates the projected severity of orbital
accidents which result in the dispersion of radioactive
debris. In order to establish definitive procedures and
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design requirements to cope with this hazard of radio-
active debris, a model of the immediate and long term
distribution of the possible debris is required. Not only
is this a necessity in establishing the responsible action
to be taken on the orbital vehicle, but also in defining
emergency space rescue operations.
has not been qualified for Space Flight. In addition,
the equipment should be specifically designed to accommo-
date the background radiations associated with the
mission. These instruments should be designed to be
flexible in function, thus minimizing the inventory of
sensors and equipment to be carried.
IN-ORBIT DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES
Conventional means of dealing with radioactive con-
tamination in a gravity environment are not generally
applicable to zero-g application. It will, therefore, be
necessary to develop in-orbit decontamination techniques
particularly for laboratories and storage areas using
isotope tracers and isotope fuel capsules. These techni-
ques should provide for on-board implementation and
consideration should be given to experiments testing
these techniques on forthcoming manned space flights.
STANDARDIZATION OF SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
At the present time, there are no firm guidelines for the
terrestrial safety analysis of nuclear power systems.
Consequently, the results presented by different con-
tractors are often difficult to compare. It is difficult
to determine the true effectiveness of design changes
or modifications. A standardized approach should be
developed, which would be used by a contractor as a
guide for performing a nuclear safety analysis.
SPACE QUALIFIED RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT
The study indicates the elements of an on-board radio-
logical safety program to be implemented by the crew
of a Space Base. While the equipment required by this
program is available with needed sensitivities for
earth-bound application, a majority of the equipment
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